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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE or IJIAH, in the interest of:
BABY GIRL c!ARIE,

Case No. 14599
A Person Under Eighteen Years of Age

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the natural mother from an Order and
Judgment of the Juvenile Court entered on January 9, 1975, permanently
deprivin~

girl

her of all parental rights in connection

~·!arie;

rcfus1nc to
January

~ith

her child, baby

and from a decision of the Juvenile Court on May 4, 1976,
~a-ate

and •et aside as null and void its order entered on

9, 1975.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Juvenile Court, upon petition of the Utah Division of
Family Services, found that the natural mother was unable to provide
adequately for all the needs of said child and agreed that it was in
the beot interest ,,f said child for parental rights to be terminated
and for said child t0 be placed for adoption.
hearinc

~a·

held at

~hicl1

On April 22, 1976, a

the Juvenile Court refuseJ to vacate and set

'·L ur:r

Seier

!I' ,

1;; AP PE...I.L

r:,e ap;,cllant seeks to have the order of the Juvenile Court,
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terminating the appellant's parental rights, set aside as null and void
because it was entered beyond the dispositional power of the Juvenile
Court under the particular circumstances of this case.

Also,

the appel-

lant seeks reversal of the decision of the Juvenile Court, entered on
May 4, 1976, refusing to vacate and set aside the Court's order of
January 9, 1975.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant takes exception to respondent's Statement of the
Facts in the following respects:
1.

The respondent's brief states of the appellant that "She

appeared at Court intent upon giving up the baby.

After a probing dis-

cussion with the Court she restated her previous decision that it "'as
in the best interests of the child to give it up and voluntarilv did so
in open court."

(Respondent's Brief, 2).

is simply not true.

Appellant asserts that this

The transcript of the January 9, 1975, hearing

clearly shows that the natural mother wanted to keep her child and that
she thought it best that the child remain in a foster home where it had
already been placed for a one (1) year period.
2.

(Tr. 3, January 9, 1975'

Respondent's Statement of Facts also indicates that there

is no direct testimony that either the DFS Social \-lorkcr or the appdlant's parents were advising or, in the one case, demandin~ that she
release her child for adoption.

(Respondent's llrief, 2 ,, ) '.

Appellant

asserts, to the contrary, that the transcript oi the Januar: "· 1'17),
hearing could hardly evidence extreme parental prcsS>tr<' tu rclinr:11isl, a
child for adoption with more clarity.

As for the position

•I

t•i :, ,

: '"'
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petition for termination of parental rights speaks for itself.

All of

these mat'=ers •..•ould have been completely supported by direct evidence
!1ad the Ju•Jenile court not refused to hear testimony on these very
issues at the April 22, 1976, hearing on appellant's petition to vacate
a~d

set aside the termination of appellant's parental rights.

This re-

fusal was objected to by the appellant at the April 22, 1976, hearing.
nr. lo, April 22, 1976)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
rHE J'.-.c::;ru: ClllJF.i HAD JURISDICTION TO VACATE ITS PREVIOUSLY
ENTERE'I c>RDER.
~espondent

has argued that District Courts have excl-'cve jur-

isdiction c•ver adoption proceedings.
ac:rees.

With this the appellant completely

However, the respondent has submitted that once an adoption

necitiun is

::iled tite ~~istrict court's _1urisu!_ctior.

lS

11

paramount in

all issues necessarv to the adoption, including whether or not

Jecidin~

Appellant voluntarilv consented to termination of the parental rights
and whether or not she was afforded due process in the termination pro(Respondent's Brief, 5)

ceedin,~."

t~is

I:c ··;ppc1rt of
:rin.bles' .-'\d,•pll<Jr:. 1•

contentiol' respondent has cited In Re

.rtah 2d 18tl, J9H P.2d 25 ,,rtail l9b5).

The appel-

lant ..-;qhmit-., t11at t11t:rc ts a fundamental difference between the circum',: Jn

al

Ll'

\a< ..

wd

c~te

,-: , r .•r .,,,,
t
;1r ,,

t

,

l

llt

r.1a~tl'r

1t

n,,~·

hefore this court.

In Trimble
---

a' ti rst necessarY to submit the issue
,,, a ,Jetenlinatic'n before the adoption

,1
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1953, as amended, specifically covers the question and the decision in
Trimble was correctly reached.

However, in the appellant's situation

the Juvenile Court already had jurisdiction over the child Babv Girl
Marie; and although the Juvenile Court is a creature of statute, with
limited jurisdiction, Section 55-10-65, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, specifically establishes the Juvenile Court as a court of equal status

~.•ith

the district courts of this state in those limited areas of its jurisdiction.

So, while the district court may decide all issues pertinent

to an adoption, it is submitted that once the juvenile court's jurisdiction has previously been invoked, that the district court may not
oust the jurisdiction of the juvenile court simply because an adoption
petition has been filed.

Indeed, to hold otherwise would permit the

district court, to which the juvenile court has equal status in its
limited jurisdictional areas, to sit in review as a quasi-appellate bod\·
over juvenile court decisions.

This is not permitted under Section

55-10-65.
By statute and prior case law precedent the Juvenile Courts
have the inherent power to modify or vacate a previously entered erroneous order.

(See Appellant's Brief, Point II).

As a court of equal

status with the district courts, should a juvenile LOurt exercise tl1e
power granted to it by Section 55-l!l-l!lh and morlit·· ,,r vacat~ an errc'neous order, its decision must be equally binding upon the district

court because in those limited areas

h'herL·in

already established its juri.<:>diction, it
diction under statutory lac1.

Section

\1a<-.

t!tc

JlJ\'L·n' l•_

L_·x<- l11

))-liJ-7/

1\L

l

Lnttrt
1 "'tlldl

''·' •.

It is submitted that even though an adoption has rntl'rV<'ned,

lJ.l"
Jllrl...__

,!f1t('ri'll

d

leVI<'

a termination order i~ 1)nly proper in tilL ~)'lJ r-,.,,H
I .Jt
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•

I •

or~

that, rccarrlless of the nature of a proceeding in the district court,

·-~,..

']i<:;t;ir t

1 ,.,_.111

lr:-: cn

1

court "lav nnt sit ac; an appellate or revie't·] hody over prior

1rt

dec i

c

i

O""'

•

Respondent has further argued that the Juvenile Court in any
event terminated its jurisdiction over the child on December 4, 1975,
therebv mooting the issues of this appeal.

However, appellant asserts

that the issues raised in this appeal are indeed anything but moot.
Appellant was not afforded due process at the termination hearing in
that she was not informed of a right to appeal.

The error was in the

Ju\'enile Court, not the appellant; and at the very least, in a matter of

t'' is importance, sloe is entitled to a review of that decision by the
~i2hest

judicial
fhe

~odv

in this state.

resp~nde~t

loas also submitted that the petition to vacate

tile: terPOinatior nrder vas precluded bv Section 55-10-108, U.C.A. 1953,
'"' .:1coended.

However, appellant's petition •,oas hrought under Section

55-1(1-106 on the hasis that the original order itself was improper and
erroneous, not on the basis of changed circumstances which would have
been prohibited by Section 55-10-108.
··n~c1fic

On Section 55-10-106 there is no

time period during <-1lich a modification or vacation of an order
\ppellant's contention is that ·mder the totality of

,, _\ l

)1

'T''I

.,t arhi

~hL'

trial juJ~e ha\·L· al·Kll\)\.,,ledged that

"'•'d at

the Ct"'~ncl'.ISion of the

Tanuary 9, 1975,
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termination hearing that she had a right to appeal the
(Respondent's Brief, 10).

or.ler.

t~rr.ination

It is submitted that until the appellant kne·.•·

of her right to appeal, which she did not, laches certainly Jnes not
apply, nor does the one month appeal time begin to run,
suggested two mitigating factors,

Respondent has

First, that the appellant, although

not represented at the termination hearing itself, had representation at
prior hearings.

Why would she have any need to know of a right to appeal

from the other prior proceedings?

This is a specious argument because

at the other hearings appellant did not lose her child.

Respondent

asserts that the appellant could have had representation at the termination hearing; however, there is not a shred of direct testimony nor
evidence from the record to support this statement, and it is somewhat
ridiculous to suggest that although the trial judge "said nothing about
appeal at the conclusion of the January 9 hearing,
probable that he did so before the hearing."

In any event it is

(Respondent's Brtef, 10!.

Respondent has also chosen to characterize the failure to inform the
appellant of the right to appeal as "insignificant and unprej ud icial."
It is submitted that nothing could be farther from the truth, as is so
tragically demonstrated by this very appeal.
Secondly, respondent asserts that the appellant was aware of
her right to appeal because the notice is gtven on

ch~

summons she re-

ceived requiring her attendance at the January 9, 1975, hearing.

l'hi·.

argument meets neither the letter nor the sp1r1t of the la.,,· a' · ct "''t
by either Section 55-10-96, U.C.A. l'JS;, a·. amellric·l,

'I [1

which says:
l.

After the dispositional hean11g, the
shall enter a11 dpprupridlt: .le( rt·t·

'I

l<JOlll
(il:--.jl(l'-,11

1 '''·
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Aft~r

2.

entry of the decree, the Court shall
•'%[•lC<in L" ~ party not represented by counsel
h1s right to appeal the Court's decisi~n.
,Jclded 1

iLr;lfillasis

POINT III
!HE APPELlANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS WERE IMPROPERLY TERMINATED
!HE JL".'i:::ILE COURT.

Respondent has raised the valid argument that Section
55-10-10911' (a

l

U,C .A. 1953, as amended, not only permits termination

when parents are unfit or incompetent, but also when conditions seriously
detrimental to the child are in existence.

Respondent's brief on page 14

lists five cc1nditionc til•.1Ught to be seriously detrimental to the child:
'l

Ihc

1

ch1l~

in

~~1~

care of appellant
~t..:

llnancial s:..1pport for

u11o:illin~

lac.t'' pdrento., ·,·erL

ar1J

~auld

1dd

'U

t~u~eless.

the child.

to care tor the child.
.1.ncerst.

(31

1~te

dt=-"Jel-

(4) The natural

1S' -\nd that after 15 months

circumstanc~:-

there was no indication the

be

. .:.~.

The ar.;ument of "conditions seriously detrimental" to the
child, however, skirts the real issues in regard to this juvenile mother.
Were those conditions which existed on January 9, 1975, of the nature
that they "'ere pen:1anent .'

Could the conditions not have been corrected
t

'~ \ ' r· .

ldlll '::.

part:Illdl

' d ' ' ' 1 ,, '

r 1

]··--

1

~

:1t--~_·,J

],1'-..._·

l r:lt'

'·'h~· \~·a....,

:J

,1n .!etrimental ..:,_)nJ1t1uns.

t

n\Jll ,L

necessary ,1n

\-,·rv c,>ndi tions had been eliminated by the

r'

hume 'llltil

,j L·l

'.::.ermination of appel-

'.'lj,•lilt•

·lit'

1t '-L~L~lJ have been

c~lll·,~ed "L·onditil1ns seriL1usly detrimental"

·,,'1'(' 1o!
t!JL2.t_' (rl(':.tiun~ h'ere 3tlS~rered 1
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nor was any testimony offered or received on a

important questions.

~i'l...:lE:

~ '- l

The record is abso,utelv barren

support a finding that the conditions c.· lcJ •l.•t c•r

-,c

,f

,)re

l {~ 'l \

,:_

.'c)•JL:

and this court has previously ruled that ternnnatluL1 should only oe
resorted to when the home situation would not or could not he correcte.J.
Inez Pilling et al v. Donna Lance, 2J Ut.2d 407, 4b4 P.2d 395, at 3Y7
(Utah 1970)
As a policy matter, appellant submits that it is vitally important that in termination cases when parents are alleged unfit or
incompetent or conditions are alleged to be "seriously detrimental" to

.1

child that the juvenile court be required to hear testimony after a f tl 1
and complete investigation oy eit•.er IJJo or Ll1e c JrL
showing that the incompetency or conditions are permanent ,,r so •erlO<'
as to require termination; showing that there are

'h.l

·nallle alcen·ati·
,.,,~·r··~

by which a natural parent's rights could be preotcrvec.

chat a

juvenile parent's incompetency or conditions are not merely a function
of the juvenile's temporary status; showing the court in cases of
alleged voluntary termination and relinquishment of parental rights that,
particularly in cases of juvenile mothers, there is no coercion trum
juvenile's parents forcing such a de'-- isiotl. an·J sl~u·.~·.Ltl_' cl1L ._uurt t::1a

it is genuinely rn tl1e best intere:ot

•l

_t,c

_, ll·

J

:__,_

icl:_

occur.

cedural

ezactn~~·

r 1e'_.

"'

,.,

Divi::.ivn,
followed

ar1y

of these minimal steps in regard tu

Lttl:

rttatLer

.tl

IJdlt\t,
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tile

tragic situation could probably have been avoided.

The permanancy of a

termination proceeding requires that it not be handled in a summary
fashion, and appellant urges the Court to take this opportunity to establish specific guidelines for terminations of parental rights in the
Juvenile Courts.
The respondent also stated in point (5) of POINT III (Respondent's Brief, 14; that at the April 22, 1976 hearing there was no indication the circumstances had changed permitting a revocation of the court's
January 9, 1975, order.

There was no such evidence only because the

Juvenile Court refused to permit testimony from either the natural mother,
or her parents, which would have supported the position and allegations
of the appellant.

Appellant objected, at the April 22, 1976

hearing,

to this re:CJsal of the Juvenile Court to permit testimony into the record
1n regard to the circcll:lstances surrounding the relinquishment of the
child and the natural mc1ther' s present qualifications to have custody of
11 er

child, and reasserts this as error on the part of the Juvenile Court.

(Tr lb, April 22, 1976)

POINT IV
APPELLANT '.lAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT THE HEARING
, 11; THE PETITION Tll TERNINATE HER PARENTAL RIGHTS.
;;esp,,nJent 11as stated that appellant ;.·as 'lOt denied counsel
because sl1e had been represented at prior hearings and Attorney Daines
't'""' rea.':: tc' ap?ear '''Lh appellant at the January 9, 1975 hearing.
;1 1" latl<'r ,catc•f'lcr.t '": respc1ndent is not supported bv the evidence. The

.1 ,t 1 ,L'''

1 ,, 1•

hl'[;.·cen l'•e appellant, the County Attornev, a DFS worker,
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and the court regarding the mother's appearance without counsel.
Juvenile Court refused to hear rebuttal testimony on this

poin~.

The
and t!,c

transcript of the April 22, 1976 hearing (page 12) clearly reflects the
disagreement of the appellant.

The appellant reasserts error on the

part of the Court in refusing to hear testimony from the appellant on
this issue.
Again, respondent asserts appellant received notice of her
right to counsel because it was printed on the summons received by the
appellant requiring her appearance at the January 9, 1975 hearing.
Again, this is a specious argument meeting neither the letter nor the
spirit of the law.
of right to counsel.

Section 55-10-109(2) requires actual, verbal advice
The record indicates quite clearly that this •..Jas

not done.
Appellant also submits to the Court that it should be held

3•

a matter of legal policy that terminations of parental rights ,,•ill not
be permitted absent the appearance or appointment of counsel, particularly in circumstances as presented here, where the parent in question
was a juvenile, whose own parents had refused to appear with her before
the Court, and who had no guidance or advice •Jpon which to rely in
making such an important decision.

CONCLUSION
The appellant asserts that she has had her parental
improperly and unlawfully terminated.

This uccurreJ

ile Court acted in a very casual manner \·Jhen it '-,()

the parental rights of the appellant.

l·.'e urge tl,c

opportunity to formulate adequate ::._>-uidcline~

Ior

ri ~l1t'

·vc;J.•t.•" L],,.
~~~1n1ari l·

1 ourl

I'ILIJrl~·

L<•

I''V"P-

tt·rr'·lnat l 1
t.1i·c·

lt~n~~in<...tl

l'1J

i·lll
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that this type of appeal need not come before this Court again.

We also

urge the Court to look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the termination of the juvenile mother's parental rights and rule that
the termination order must be vacated, returning to the appellant her
parental rights in Baby Girl Marie.

F-:~·~,2.~
_/,

Attorney for Appellant
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